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Abstract 
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing humanity, as well as one of the 
largest failures faced by the market.  Despite projections of climate-related reductions in global 
GDP of up to 20% and studies indicating compromise of the world’s water, food, and ecosystem 
services, international agreements confronting climate change remain difficult.  This has led to a 
search for quick and easy solutions, resulting in a focus on the reduction of tropical deforestation 
and forest degradation, which contributes 6-17% of global CO2 emissions. 
Efforts to address tropical deforestation and forest degradation have culminated in the 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) program.  REDD 
operates on the idea that it is cheaper to pay forest-based communities in developing nations to 
stop cutting down trees and change their land-use patterns than it is to get powerful companies in 
developed nations to reduce their emissions.  In order to integrate these forests into the global 
carbon market, commodification of forests is required, on a level previously unseen.  While 
REDD may be in the interest of heavily polluting developed nations, is it in the interests of the 
communities who live in these forests?  Are forest-based communities given as much 
consideration in REDD readiness proposals as measures required for market integration?  This 
study finds an overemphasis on market integration and a disregard for democratic methods of 
participation within REDD proposals.  Social protections are underemphasized, placing forests, 
forest-based communities, and the hopes for cheap climate solutions all at risk.     
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Despite projections of climate related reductions in global GDP of up to 20% under 
business as usual assumptions (Stern, 2006) and studies indicating compromise of the world’s 
water, food, and ecosystem services (World Bank, 2012), international agreements confronting 
climate change remain difficult.  This has led to a search for quick and easy solutions, resulting 
in a focus on the reduction of tropical deforestation and forest degradation, which contributes 6-
17% of global CO2 emissions (Baccini et al., 2012; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[IPCC], 2007). 
Efforts to address tropical deforestation and forest degradation have resulted in the 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) program, a Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) program which is the product of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  The ‘+’ in REDD+ refers to “conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2008, p. 10).  REDD+ operates on the idea that it is 
cheaper to pay forest-based communities in developing nations to stop cutting down trees and 
change their land-use patterns than it is to get powerful companies in developed nations to 
reduce their emissions.  While emission reductions using technological solutions, such as carbon 
scrubbers, run around $1,000/tCO2 (House et al., 2011), REDD+ is to provide carbon reduction 
at around $55-$75/tCO2 (Sandker et al., 2010). 
In order to know whom to pay for reductions and for systematic measure of the 
reductions contributed by resulting land-use changes, it is necessary to know who owns the 
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forests. The need to know who owns forests is resulting in a planned commodification of forests 
on a scale hitherto unseen.  Many people live in these forests. Will integration of forests into a 
nascent carbon market benefit these forest-based communities or marginalized them? Will they 
gain and retain title or will they lose their de facto rights to live in and on the forests? Will they 
be paid for carbon storage or will the payments go to others? 
A literature review of the implementations of previous forestry-based ‘payment for 
ecosystem services’ (PES) schemes indicates problems, including unmet opportunity costs, 
misleading contracts, unreasonable contract length, land grabbing, and elite capture.  These 
issues could be tempered through representation of local people in project design and 
implementation, as well as inclusion of other potential safeguards against expropriation and 
unequal distribution of benefits. 
In addition to aiming to set up a global carbon market that promotes the storage of carbon 
in standing forests, REDD+ programs also recognize the need to accompany such integration 
with social and environmental protections. Promotional REDD+ documents make reference to 
benefits such as participation; Free, Prior and Informed Consultation or Consent (FPIC); fair 
distribution of benefits.  Are these benefits present in the proposals which will be to implement 
REDD+ and how are they balanced against those the requirements for market integration? 
My study analyzed five United Nation’s REDD+ National Program Documents (NPDs) 
and five World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) REDD Readiness Preparation 
Proposals (R-PPs), exploring the balance between market integration and social protections. The 
study will compare the clarity of requirements for market integration to social safeguards within 
these key REDD+ implementation documents.  My hypothesis is that elements within the 
REDD+ proposals required for future integration into the global carbon market will be   and 
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operationalized while those elements detailing social protections, or “safeguards”, for forest-
based communities will be vague and incomplete. 
To conduct this analysis, the study develops a series of metrics to analyze these REDD+ 
implementation documents.  The first set of metrics is based upon the required commodification 
steps required to convert forests into marketable emission reductions for integration into the 
market.  The second set of metrics is based upon the social protections required for forest-based 
communities to exercise some measure of control over their integration.  These metrics are 
analyzed on the basis of clarity as well as whether they are budgeted, scheduled, or included in 
the Terms of Reference. 
Within these proposals, this study found a focus on the tools required for market 
integration and an uneven adaptation of social safeguards.  Five proposals were planning 
implementation of privatized tenure reforms while three recognized a need for tenure reform but 
did not plan to implement reforms.  The Panamanian NPD and R-PP proposals took two different 
stances, with the R-PP reaffirming state ownership of land while the NPD pursued privatized 
tenure reform.    Six proposals planned to implement reforms clarifying of carbon rights.  Four of 
the proposals did not make reference to carbon reform, with three of those four countries 
operating under state control of land and at risk of elite capture of benefits.  Four out of the six 
proposals which intended to conduct privatized land tenure reform planned to use participatory 
mapping techniques.  Similarly, three of the six proposals planning to clarify carbon rights 
planned to use participatory methods. 
All the proposals made reference to using IPCC or FAO standardized methods and 
language for measuring emission reductions.  All the proposals also included detailed plans to 
determine reference emission levels and to implement monitoring, reporting, and verification 
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systems.  This contrasts sharply with the two proposals which stipulated democratic 
representation in project design and implementation.  A further four proposals included 
representation on REDD+ bodies responsible for project coordination.  Nine proposals featured 
“decentralization.”  Of these, three appeared to be decentralization to democratic local 
governments. One proposal decentralizes to locally elected indigenous government, but also to a 
provincial government operating under executive appointment.  Further, while the right to FPIC 
was recognized in six proposals, four proposals took the form of free, prior and informed 
consultation instead of free, prior and informed consent.  Free, prior and informed consent was 
only recognized in those proposals in which a legislative history had placed it in law prior to the 
introduction of REDD+.  Indigenous rights were in only three proposals while recognition of 
gender equality was in only two. 
In conclusion, my findings indicate that REDD+ favors market integration over social 
protections. REDD+, therefore, must elaborate how it will support democratic participation and 
social protections. It needs to define local representation and democratic process, specify the 
means by which democratic inclusion will be achieved, and outline the safeguards that will be  in 
order for involvement in REDD+ to be voluntary and consistent with the best interests of forest-
communities. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the free market theoretical origins of REDD+, the results of 
similar PES programs implemented on a free market model, and the theoretical framing of social 
safeguards designed to mitigate some of these abuses.  In Chapter 3, I discuss the metrics used to 
conduct my study. I discuss the findings of my analysis in Chapter 4.  I conclude, in Chapter 5, 
with a summary of my findings, their overall implications, and some recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framing for the Analysis of REDD+ 
This chapter will seek to explain the theory and principles upon which PES programs 
operate and how these are reified in REDD+.  It will then seek to explore how implementation of 
these PES programs has played out for forest-based communities.  The chapter will conclude 
with a reanalysis of the problems experienced in PES implementations to date and the role 
safeguards could play in mitigating problems and protecting forest-based communities, 
contributing to future REDD+ successes.   
2.1 Market Basis of REDD+ 
2.1.1 Market Failures, PES, and REDD+ 
REDD+ is an effort to address climate change, which results from the overproduction of 
carbon emissions.  Because firms do not have to pay for carbon emissions, they can externalize 
them without raising the marginal variable cost of production, so firms have an incentive to 
maximize production and thereby maximize pollution (Turner, Pearce, & Bateman, 1993, p. 75).  
This overproduction of emissions reflects the largest market failure the world has ever seen 
(Stern, 2006; World Bank, 2010).  Carbon credits, produced through emission reductions such as 
those advanced by programs like REDD+, in conjunction with an emission cap, seek to 
internalize the cost of pollution, correcting this market failure. 
Emission reduction focused Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes operate 
under the Coasean theory that constructing pollution permits and allowing them to be traded 
across the market should correct the market failure presented by the externalization of pollution 
(Aslanbeigui & Medema, 1998).  Wunder (2005, p. 3) defines PES as a voluntary transaction 
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where a well-defined environmental service is bought by a minimum of one environmental 
service buyer from a minimum of one environmental service provider if the environmental 
service provider meets the terms of the contract (what Wunder (2009) refers to as achieving 
conditionality).  In the case of REDD+, or REDD+ like schemes, the environmental service 
being provided is an emission reduction. 
According to paragraph 70 of the Cancun Agreement, REDD+ entails five different 
environmental services capable of qualifying for payments: (1) reducing emissions from 
deforestation, (2) reducing emissions from forest degradation, (3) conservation of forest carbon 
stocks, (4) sustainable management of forests, and (5) enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2011, p. 12).  Payment for one of 
the above activities requires that specified conditions be met. 
Proving that a reduction in emissions has occurred requires first that a reference emission 
level (REL) is established. A REL is established through determination of the national historical 
baseline, an analysis of the policies and practices which were responsible for that baseline, and 
an extrapolation of emission levels under a business as usual (BAU) scenario in which 
development proceeds as a counterfactual without REDD+ intervention.  A crediting baseline is 
then established in which reductions in emissions will result in the creation of emission reduction 
certificates or carbon credits, which can be sold. 
To establish the reduction in emissions (and the saleable credits produced), remote 
sensing, GIS analysis, and field-based carbon sampling must be conducted to complete 
monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of land use changes.  Carbon accounting of 
changes reported is then conducted to create carbon credits and to allow investors to have faith 
that reductions are being accomplished.  In order to obtain reductions in a cost effective manner, 
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countries often spatially analyze a number of socioeconomic and environmental variables 
gathered during the construction of the REL to target areas for REDD+ projects where the 
greatest emission reductions can be obtained for the lowest costs.  In order for economic 
incentives to be coupled to changes in land use tracked through the processes detailed above, 
property rights must be assigned to lands. These lands are usually state or community owned, 
often they lack title,   and therefore the forest   must undergo a process of commodification. 
2.1.2 Commodification of Forests 
In order to provide for the production of emission reductions as a marketable commodity, 
forests must undergo commodification.  In 1944, Karl Polanyi defined commodities as 
“…objects produced for sale on the market” (Polanyi, 1944/2001, p. 75).  This relates the object 
(the commodity) as the intermediary between production and consumption (Prudham, 2009).  
Nature is not produced for sale and is not readily a commodity.  In this sense, following Polanyi 
(1944/2001), it is a ‘fictitious commodity’.   As Castree (2003) points out, commodification is a 
verb which entails a sequence of actions which convert nature into a commodity.  Castree 
describes this process as occurring through six stages proceeding from privatization, to 
alienability, to individuation, to abstraction, to valuation, and concluding in displacement, where 
the consumable commodity is fully separated from its production.  These stages are required to 
produce emission reductions as a commodity.  This allows them to be integrated for trade into 
global carbon markets. 
2.1.3 Carbon market integration and REDD+ “Green Peripheries” 
Commodification is necessary to integrate the carbon sequestration capabilities of forests 
into the nascent emission reduction market.  The question is, who benefits from this integration? 
In analyzing who benefits, we need to consider the consequences for both the buying and 
selling nations.  Bumpus and Livermann (2011) and McAfee (2012) provide valuable insights 
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into this process.  REDD+ will allow developed countries to continue their highly profitable 
patterns of production.  REDD+ makes payments to landowners on an opportunity costs basis 
and spatially targets project areas on the basis of poverty and potential environmental gains, the 
payments made to landowners will only be that amount which is required to prevent alternative 
land-use decisions.  In the future, this would be further disciplined by competition across the 
market.  This would allow companies to keep their costs down by enabling them to minimize the 
marginal cost of abatement.  Once emission reduction credits are constructed, they could be 
bought and resold in the market, allowing further profit to be realized by developed nations in 
the reselling of credits. 
Forest-based communities’ land-use choices are constrained for long periods and the 
payments they receive are (theoretically) marginally higher than those they previously made. 
Because they now cannot harvest the same mix of goods from the land they become dependent 
upon purchased products (commodities) that they had previously produced for themselves.  This 
arrangement simultaneously 1) allows developed countries to profit off the increasing 
commodification of nature, while 2) also allowing developed countries and national 
entrepreneurs to profit from new commodity markets that emerge from the concomitant 
dependence of forest-based communities on commodities to meet the needs that they had 
previously satisfied through direct production. 
The transformation of forest-based communities into producers of emission reductions 
and the subsequent limiting of these producers to the bare minimum payment to maintain 
REDD+-related land use behavior according to an opportunity cost analysis, serve as the 
conceptual basis for referring to these project areas as “green peripheries.” These are areas 
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subject to the pressures and processes of peripheralization detailed by Wallerstein (1984).  
Developed nations are the clear beneficiaries in this new process of green peripheralization. 
Construction of “green peripheries” is part of the broader expansion of forms of green 
capitalism detailed by other authors (Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012; Goldman, 2005; 
McAfee, 2012; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004).  The origins of classical economic liberalism in 
the enclosure movement provided the foundation for neoliberal acceptance of free market 
environmentalism and green capitalism (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004).  Goldman (2005) 
provides a history and logic behind the emergence of the World Banks as a “green hegemon”, 
acting to push the World Bank’s neoliberal agenda forward behind the globally recognized need 
to respond to climate change and the legitimacy provided by green development.  Fairhead, 
Leach, and Scoones (2012) detail how this has increasingly resulted in land grabs, which they 
reference as “green grabbing,” which are legitimated behind the green credentials of providing 
food security, biofuels, and carbon sequestration.  How PES results in relations of unequal 
exchange are discussed by McAfee (2012).  All this serves to illustrate that there is a strong 
theoretical argument to support how these projects, marketed on the basis of conservation and 
poverty alleviation, actually serve to subsume those involved in producing them in similar 
relations we have traditionally seen formed between developed and developing nations.  A 
review of the literature on PES supports this conclusion. 
2.2 Results of PES implementations thus far 
A review of forestry-related PES literature establishes that peripheralization is occurring 
in the absence of any mitigating factors.  The prima facie assumption that participation in a PES 
program is always better than non-participation, premised upon payments exceeding opportunity 
costs, itself a low bar, is not always accurate (Bartels, Schmink, Borges, Duarte, & dos Santos 
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Arcos, 2010; Corbera, 2010; German, Ruhweza, Mwesigwa, & Kalanzi, 2010).  A number of 
problems were observed by researchers studying the practice of PES. Local people were engaged 
on unfavorable terms and without concern for their basic needs and human rights. 
Few studies of REDD+ and PES have yet been done. Those surveyed turned up the 
following problems. First, the poor were sometimes targeted as the drivers of deforestation and 
forest degradation and subjected to restrictions on forest livelihoods and evictions (Beymer-
Farris & Bassett, 2011; Daily News, 2011; Lang, 2012, May 9). Second, frontloaded contracts 
and misleading payment schedules to those with land title were found to be common (German et 
al., 2010; Jindal, 2010), and many of these contracts had unreasonable lengths (Jindal, 2010; 
Osborne, 2011). In engaging local populations, the payments were made up front so that the 
majority or all income would be received early on, making the contracts more attractive while 
obligating the land owners to long-term protections. In addition, studies also found elite capture 
(Leggett & Lovell, 2012) and reports have been made on criminal charges for corruption and 
embezzlement (Makoye, 2012, March 2).  There was also evidence of PES programs being used 
as a new form of land grabbing (Fairhead et al., 2012), as well as their tendency to place   an 
undue burden on the participants (Osborne, 2011) with many indirect costs falling on 
nonparticipants (German et al., 2010).  All PES programs that have been studied have serious 
problems. These observations illustrate the impact that PES programs can have on the 
livelihoods of marginalized forest communities and challenge the prima facie assumption that 
participation is always the most rational choice. 
Further examples of abuses are commonly provided on the blog www.redd-monitor.org.  
In one article, Chris Lang (Lang, 2012, November 23) detailed findings from a report entitled 
“No REDD Papers” written by the Carbon Trade Watch, the Global Justice Ecology Project, the 
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Indigenous Environmental Network, the Justseeds Artists’ Cooperative and the Timberwatch 
Coalition.  In Lang’s report, the consequences of the ten most abusive REDD+ type cases are 
listed.  These cases include the use of armed police to violently limit access to forest livelihoods; 
deceitfully obtained consent and abusive contracts used to capture indigenous land rights; 
potentially life threatening violation of indigenous voluntary isolation; use of REDD+ type 
projects as a marketing tool to green wash dirty industries; violation of national First, Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) laws; violent evictions and land grabs.  These cases support the 
contention that these market solutions to climate change, left unregulated, expose forest-based 
communities to exploitation and damages and require social protections or safeguards to allow 
this to be an acceptable and viable solution to addressing short-term climate-related needs. 
2.3 Social Safegaurds – A Response 
2.3.1 Polanyi and Social Protections 
Social protections act to mitigate the abuses which accompany laissez faire, free market 
capitalism.  Polanyi (1944/2001) viewed social protections as emerging naturally in response to 
the deprivations of the market.  Polanyi articulated this as “the double movement,” where the 
first act is played out by economic liberalization, giving rise to the spontaneous emergence of the 
second act, the demand for social protections against the vagaries of the market and economic 
predation.  In Polanyi’s analysis, the political behavior, which led to these social protections, 
were emergent.  The political pursuit of social protections are the chiral reflection of capitalism’s 
invisible hand; the spontaneous organizing of the people around their own self-interest.  It is a 
natural response to human needs and vulnerability. 
A social protection, which I’ll refer to as a safeguard, is any mechanism that mediates the 
effects of the market by giving people a way of having their interests protected, or a way of 
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representing and defending their interests.  The political production of a safeguard can be seen as 
a reflexive response to exposure to vulnerability, where vulnerability is “an aggregate measure of 
human welfare that integrates environmental, social, economic and political exposure to a range 
of potentially harmful perturbations” (Bohle, Downing, & Watts, 1994, p. 37). 
2.3.2 Safeguards   
With this definition of vulnerability and our understanding of the role of social 
protections, we can analyze the literature review and try to understand what would be required to 
mediate some of the damages of PES which have been observed.  How can we protect against 
frontloaded and misleading contracts (German et al., 2010; Jindal, 2010), payments which failed 
to exceed opportunity costs (Bartels et al., 2010; Corbera, 2010; German et al., 2010), contract 
lengths (Jindal, 2010; Osborne, 2011), elite capture (Leggett & Lovell, 2012), corruption and 
embezzlement (Makoye, 2012, March 2).  These are all issues which stem from a lack of ability 
of forest community members to participate in program design and a lack of checks and balances 
over project implementation.  This is primarily an issue of insufficient democratic participation 
in the project design and implementation process as well as a lack of tools to ensure that 
participation is kept voluntary and flexible to changing circumstances.  The second set of issues 
includes topics such as the targeting of the poor as deforestation drivers (Beymer-Farris & 
Bassett, 2011; Daily News, 2011; Lang, 2012, May 9), land grabs (Fairhead et al., 2012), and 
restricted access to livelihoods (Lang, 2012, November 23).  These are issues that revolve 
around, and would be resolved by recognition of secure tenure rights established through 
participatory mapping practices and access to resources.  Human rights would further serve to 
provide a further force of political legitimation and potential access to legal recourse to hold 
those abusing forest communities accountable for their actions. 
13 
 
These conclusions are in line with the analysis of safeguards provided by Chhatre et al. 
(2012), who similarly delineated two primary safeguards necessary for an effective REDD+ 
program: (1) tenure security and (2) participation in design and implementation of REDD+.  
Chhatre et al. (2012) point out that these two safeguards provide near immediate benefits as well 
as sustained benefits.  Tenure security allows forest communities to secure access to land and 
productive resources, which allows them to improve their lands and realize greater livelihood 
returns.  When this is a widespread phenomenon within a community, it improves the adaptive 
capacity of that community.  All boats are raised by a rising tide. 
One must be careful, however, in stipulating participation without also detailing 
democratic controls over participation.  The World Bank has been a leading proponent of 
participation since at least 1994, seeing participation as a tool for involving local people and 
reducing the development footprint and its associated costs (Hildyard, Hegde, Wolvekamp, & 
Reddy, 2001).    Participation, without explication as to how participation can be made 
empowering for the weaker party in the engagement, can introduce three different forms of 
tyranny: tyranny of decision-making and control, tyranny of the group, and tyranny of method 
(Cooke & Kothari, 2001).  Participation can easily function as a managerial tool, dominating the 
participants if mechanisms detailing how participation is to be made empowering are not clearly 
stipulated. 
Mechanisms must be in place to ensure empowerment of forest communities and to 
provide equal bargaining power and control over decisions regarding the REDD+ contract and 
regarding the process by which decisions are made.  Participation might meaningfully be 
performed through representatives who are both responsive to local needs and accountable to 
those they represent (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999).  Integration of democratic 
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decentralization policies or pushing financial, administrative, and legal control over REDD+ 
functions down to a locally decentralized level might allow for more responsive implementation 
of REDD+, lowering the transaction costs of implementing REDD+, increasing transparency and 
building community commitment and involvement (Ribot, 2004).  It is important that 
decentralization be meaningful in the powers transferred to the local level and that it be 
democratic.  Often these powers are transferred to customary authorities and other private 
bodies, which serve to reinforce existing inequalities or create new ones.  The choices 
governments make in transferring power to the local level, and how such transfers are structured 
has important effects on the legitimation and recognition of local identities and power relations 
(Ribot, 2002; Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2007). 
While Chhatre et al. (2012) speak directly to the requirements for safeguards and 
recognize the need for safeguards to be integrated vertically and horizontally, Peskett, 
Huberman, Bowen-Jones, Edwards, and Brown (2008) provide a three-tier series of indicators of 
such integration which spans a scale going from individuals, to communities, to the national 
level, and on to the international level.  Their indicators looked at three topics: income and 
growth, equity, and voice and choice.  I also draw from another safeguard study (Merger, 
Dutschke, & Verchot, 2011) which provides further recommendations of necessary safeguards to 
assist in poverty alleviation.  These recommendations include governance mechanisms such as 
inclusion of laws and rights and conflict resolution mechanisms, among other recommendations. 
In Chapter 4, I develop my methods based upon on the market integration elements 
relating to REDD+ and social protections required make REDD+ work for forest-based 
communities.  These will be operationalized and applied used to analyze five NPDs and five R-
PPs. 
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Chapter 3 
Methods 
3.1 Methods 
This section analyzes five UN-REDD NPDs (Bolivia, Indonesia, Panama, Tanzania, and 
Papua New Guinea) and five FCPF R-PPs (Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, 
Panama, and Suriname) for details relating to market integration and social safeguards.  These 
published proposals are provided for the purpose of accountability and can be viewed as 
indicative of intent.  If safeguards are not well articulated here, their application elsewhere is 
even more uncertain since these documents reflect the intent of their implementing agents and 
because the absence of safeguards discussions in these documents means that elsewhere they will 
be even more difficult to obtain and will be less available for public review. 
A similar study of NPDs and R-PPs was conducted by WRI (Goers-Williams & Davis, 
2012).  Williams and Davis conducted an analysis of 2 R-PPs and 2 NPDs on the application of 
governance mechanisms such as transparency, accountability, participation, and capacity 
building.  Their study found that such mechanisms were unevenly demonstrated across 
proposals.  While my study will include similar elements to those considered in their study, these 
will be tied up within the specific market integration and social protection metrics I will be 
applying.  I will analyze 5 R-PPs and 5 NPDs, seeking to compare market integration to social 
safeguards.  Lack of safeguard inclusion may reflect a poorly constructed proposal or may 
represent a purposeful occlusion. 
My hypothesis is that elements within the REDD+ proposals required for future 
integration into the global carbon market will be well defined and operationalized while those 
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elements detailing social protections, or “safeguards”, for forest-based communities will be 
vague and incomplete.  To interrogate these, documents I develop ‘metrics’ for the market 
integration aspects of the documents as well as for the social protections aspects of the 
documents. 
3.2 Market Metrics 
In order to test my hypothesis, I first define what is required for REDD+ to be integrated 
into the market.  To do this, I operationalize the first four stages of Castree (2003)’s steps of 
commodification (stages 5 and 6 do not apply to the REDD+ proposal, but rather to the carbon 
market in general).  Castree’s first four stages of commodification are (1) privatization, (2) 
alienability, (3) individuation, (4) abstraction.  Metric 1 is based upon successful privatization 
(assumed by REDD+) and is realized through demarcation of land ownership over previously 
public land and the establishment of secure private land rights with the legal right to exclude 
third parties.  Metric 2 is achieved through alienability, which derives from the establishment of 
exchangeable carbon rights.  Metric 3, Individuation, occurs through the separation of carbon 
using scientific terminology and methodology as established by organizations such the FAO and 
IPCC.  Metric 4, Abstraction, both functionally and spatially occurs through the establishment of 
a reference emissions level and a monitoring, reporting and verification system, which separates 
carbon from its ecological context and records it in carbon registries through carbon accounting 
practices.  The four guiding metrics are included below:  
Market Metric 1:  Are private land rights defined?  If public land (government owned), is land 
title reform called for and does it define the necessary land rights or establish a review of 
current law and necessary reform? 
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Market Metric 2:  Are carbon rights or land titles defined and are they capable of being sold and 
exchanged? 
Market Metric 3:  Is carbon defined using standardized terms by organizations such as the FAO 
or the IPCC? 
Market Metric 4:  Is a reference emissions level (REL) established?  Are procedures well 
detailed for how measurements, reporting, and verification (MRV) will be conducted? 
Together these four metrics tell us the degree to which market integration is clearly 
specified in the document in question. 
3.3 Social Metrics 
In line with Polanyi’s theory of the double movement, social protections are viewed as 
responses towards vulnerabilities introduced by the market.  The metrics below are mitigating 
factors that have been referenced in more detail in the safeguards section. 
Social Metric 1 acts as a check on Market Metrics 1 and 2.  Participatory consultations 
and mapping of tenure rights seeks to make processes of tenure reform consistent with customary 
ownership patterns and practices, following the recommendations of Streck (2009).  This metric 
combines participation as a social safeguard while pursuing resolution of tenure reform and 
establishment of tenure security.  This is a procedural realization of Chhatre et al. (2012)’s 
safeguard recommendations which could lead to the substantive realization of tenure security. 
Social Metric 2 seeks participation as a safeguard, allowing integration of forest-based 
communities through REDD+ to facilitate the production of a positive political space allowing 
participants to become actively involved and empowered to design and implement the program 
to suit the needs of their communities (Chhatre et al., 2012; Peskett et al., 2008). 
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Social Metric 3 pursues the recommendations of Merger, Dutschke, and Verchot (2011) 
in looking at the inclusion of rights.  Legal recognition of Free, Prior and Informed Consent or 
the rights of indigenous people may help to prevent expropriation of land (Beymer-Farris & 
Basset, 2011; Lang, 2012, November 23), abusive contracts disregarding the rights of forest-
based communities (Lang, 2012, November 23), and so on. 
Social metric questions include: 
Social Metric 1:  Is tenure reform pursued using participatory consultations and mapping? 
Social Metric 2:  Are democratic mechanisms for participation offered?  Are representatives 
selected democratically by local people?  Are representatives able to meaningfully 
influence policy?  Are accountability mechanisms detailed to ensure that representatives 
act in the interests of their constituents? 
Social Metric 3:  Are human rights referenced and recognized? 
3.4 Measures of Commitment 
In trying to determine commitment to propositions put forward in the proposal 
documents, I look for the following to establish clarity and sincerity to the policies and 
procedures being proposed:   
 Is the metric referenced in the Terms of Reference? 
 Is the metric scheduled? 
 Is the metric included in the budget? 
 Are performance indicators (deliverables) referenced for the metric? 
 Was the subject well detailed in the body of the proposal? 
As stated before, REDD+ is still under construction.  The earliest implemented Readiness 
Projects conclude in 2012, so it is too early to be able to study any substantive effect these 
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programs may have had.  I have, therefore, focused my analysis on the Readiness Preparation 
Proposals (R-PPs) and the National Program Documents (NPDs).  The purpose of these 
proposals is not to provide a finished and fully detailed document as to how REDD+ is to be 
implemented, but to indicate the direction intended and the anticipated outputs along the way.  In 
analyzing these proposals, I assume that a lack of reference to a given metric or a lack of clarity 
in detail means that the metric is considered comparatively unimportant.  Lack of reference or 
lack of clarity may also be a political act intended to maintain flexibility in implementation.  
However, in the absence of indications as to whether that flexibility will be used to exploit 
forest-based communities in future implementations or if it will be used to adapt implementation 
to meet the requirements of conditions on the ground, I will assume that lack of clarity 
reflects a lack of commitment. 
I have developed metrics for four market metrics and three social metrics and will now 
apply them to the five R-PPs and five NDPs for 10 different proposals covering nine different 
countries. The next chapter presents the results of my analysis. 
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Chapter 4 
Findings 
In this chapter, I discuss the findings of my analysis.  They largely demonstrate that 
market metrics receive more consistent and thorough attention than social metrics.  This 
demonstrates a potential shortcoming which requires address if forest-based communities are to 
participate in REDD+ in an equitable and sustainable manner.  A discussion on these findings 
follows.   
4.1 Tenure (Market Metric 1 & 2, Social Metric 1) 
Tenure is both a market metric (market metrics 1 & 2) and a social safeguard (social 
metric 1).  Land tenure reform was recognized as problematic in each of the proposals analyzed.  
Some countries seemed unwilling to address the issue (Colombia, Indonesia, and Papua New 
Guinea).  Sunderlin et al. (2009) point out that a lack of clarity on the assigning of land rights, 
especially when it regards state land rights, may be indicative of attempts by the state or elites in 
proximity to state ministries to capture profits from carbon trading.  In the case of Colombia and 
Papua New Guinea, lack of progress is likely due to the communal nature of the rights and 
possible inculcation with cultural practices and social relations.  This is especially true in 
Colombia, where customary authorities are established through democratic elections and are held 
locally accountable and are, therefore, less likely to be able to achieve elite capture.  In 
Indonesia, where land rights are under state ownership, this could represent attempts by the 
government to capture profits from carbon rights. 
Regarding Market Metric 1 (tenure reform; see Table 4.1), no clear trend is established.  
Five countries are conducting privatizing or allocating tenure rights, or are scheduled to.   These 
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countries should be able to make clear payments to land holders. Those who have not 
implemented private tenure reforms will find it difficult to associate payments with land use 
change. 
Of the nine different countries displayed in the table, three countries were already in the 
process of tenure reform (Mexico, Bolivia, Tanzania), and two had it referenced within proposals 
(DRC, Suriname).  DRC referenced tenure reform in the Terms of Reference and Suriname 
included a budget for reform. 
Three of these countries (Colombia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea) were either unclear 
about what they planned to do about their tenure situation or, in response to previous difficulties, 
had indicated no inclination to change land tenure (Papua New Guinea, Indonesia).  Oddly 
enough, Indonesia planned on using participatory methods for determining land use, but not to 
clarify land rights.  Panama provides a more intriguing case.  Panama’s R-PP made no mention 
of clarifying land rights and went out of its way to reaffirm the right of the state over all land and 
the carbon therein while their NPD not only sought to clarify land rights, but to make the process 
participatory.  While their R-PP was submitted on May 16, 2009, their NPD had no date 
associated with it.  Changes made to policy positions between the publications of the two 
documents are assumed but incapable of being confirmed. 
The analysis of carbon rights, which is the centerpiece of Market Metric 2 (see Table 
4.1), indicates a fairly widespread intent to establish clear carbon rights, with some exceptions 
that raise fears of elite capture of payments premised on exchangeable carbon rights.  While six 
countries indicated an intent to establish carbon rights (Colombia, Mexico, Suriname, Bolivia, 
Panama (NPD), and Tanzania).  Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Papua New 
Guinea, and Panama (R-PP) signaled no intent to clarify carbon rights despite public land 
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ownership (state and communal, respectively).  Suriname scheduled it but failed to budget or 
mention it in its Terms of Reference. 
In Indonesia’s case, this could result in state capture of carbon rights.  Papua New 
Guinea’s circumstances are contingent upon how customary authorities operate.  While it may 
represent elite capture, this depends upon whether or not customary authority is established by 
and practiced through democratic practices. 
Panama displays a contradiction between their R-PP and their NPD.  In the R-PP they 
explicitly state that carbon rights are under the ownership of the state while the NPD 
acknowledges the necessity of legal review of carbon ownership, schedules it, and budgeting it, 
giving all appearances that landowners might obtain the right to benefit from emission 
reductions. 
The DRC, another country with state ownership over land, also did not make reference to 
clarification of carbon rights.  Suriname (state land ownership) scheduled clarification of carbon 
rights and placed it in the Terms of Reference but failed to budget any legal review. 
With the observations listed, the question quickly arises, “can REDD+ function without 
clarification of private tenure rights?”  Studies have shown that PES can operate under common 
property tenure regimes (Corbera, 2010) and upon state property (Bartels et al., 2010).  However, 
Sunderlin et al. (2009) warn that moving forward with REDD+ under such circumstances places 
payments at risk and exposes forest communities to potential exploitation.  The overall trend is 
that carbon rights are largely being defined, but where they are not there are legitimate concerns 
for state capture of REDD+ payments. 
Regarding Social Metric 1, participatory consultations and mapping in the resolution of 
tenure reforms were largely included where reform was already taking place.  This is in the best 
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interest of program implementers and landholders as it resolves potential conflicts which may 
endanger the project.  Five of the ten proposals (Panama, Indonesia, Bolivia, Mexico, DRC) 
contained provisions to include forest-based communities in the delineation of property rights.  
Indonesia included participatory measures for zoning resource use, but had no intention of 
reforming land tenure which is governed under state ownership.  Another troubling observation 
was the inclusion of the right to involuntary relocation of villagers within the same paragraph in 
which these voluntary methods were discussed in the DRC R-PP, creating a truly troubling 
juxtaposition.  While it is encouraging to see that four out of the six proposals which planned on 
conducting tenure reform planned on including participatory mechanisms for conducting the 
reforms, two did not plan on including such mechanisms and four of the proposals did not plan 
on conducting tenure reform. 
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Table 4.1 – Tenure (Market Metric 1 & 2, Social Metric 1) 
Country Prior/Current 
Tenure Regime 
Land Rights: 
Market Metric 1 
Carbon Rights: 
Market Metric 2 
Participation: 
Social Metric 1 
Colombia 
(R-PP) 
Community 
Ownership 
Unclear Budget/Scheduled None 
DRC 
(R-PP) 
State Tenure Reform 
mentioned in 
Implementation 
Framework Terms 
of Reference 
No Reference Participatory Mapping to 
begin in 2010; Note - 
Involuntary Relocation 
reserved in the SESA 
Mexico 
(R-PP) 
Community 
Owned 
85% completed Budgeted/Scheduled Reference to community 
involvement in legal 
structuring (ToR 1b-2, 
Component 2a), but not 
explicitly scheduled/budgeted 
Panama 
(R-PP) 
State State Explicitly State Owned No Mention; State Legal 
Protections Mentioned 
Suriname 
(R-PP) 
State Reform 
Budgeted/not 
Scheduled 
Scheduled/not 
budgeted/ToR reference 
None 
 
Bolivia 
(NPD) 
Community 
Managed 
50% titled, in 
progress 
(Output 1.4) - 
scheduled/budgeted/Log
Frame 
Budgeted/scheduled (output 
1.4) and in LogFrame 
Indonesia 
(NPD) 
State Listed as 
problematic, no 
reform indicated 
None District Based Consensus on 
land and forest use (Output 
3.1.5) - 
Budgeted/Scheduled/LogFram
e 
Panama 
(NPD) 
State (Output 1.1) 
Scheduled/budgete
d 
(Output 1.1) 
Scheduled/budgeted 
(Output 1.1) – 
scheduled/budgeted 
Tanzania 
(NPD) 
State Transitioning to 
private 
(Output 1.1.3) - 
budgeted/scheduled 
None  
PNG 
(NPD) 
Communal Problematic, 
reform difficulties 
None Referenced in risk log, 
nowhere else. 
  
4.2 Market Metrics 
Market metrics 3 was satisfied in each of the proposals and market metric 4 was 
consistently the most detailed portion of the proposals.   For market metric 3 (see Table 4.2, 
below), nine out of ten proposals plan on following IPCC methodologies, with the exception 
being Bolivia, which mentioned an intention to use either FAO or IPCC methodologies, but in 
one place referenced FAO methodologies in the absence of IPCC methodologies.  Market metric 
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3 establishes a very clear trend of intent to apply standardized methodologies to delineate carbon 
in project areas. 
Each country also had detailed plans for establishing reference emission levels and for 
the implementation of a monitoring, reporting, and verification system.  They varied in what 
strategies they planned to apply, what technologies they planned on utilizing, organizations that 
they planned to collaborate with, and synergies they claimed to be able to build upon.  However, 
even those countries with less experience with technologies and techniques required for a 
REDD+ type program recognized that lower tier reference emission levels, which are less 
accurate and less profitable, would be suitable for entry level participation and that increases in 
saleable emission reductions would serve as an incentive to improve capabilities in order to 
achieve tier 3 or 4 reference emission levels. 
Table 4.2 - Market Metrics 2 & 3 
Country Standards Body 
Market Metric 3 
Reference Emission Levels and Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
systems detailed? 
Market Metric 4 
Colombia IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
DRC IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Mexico IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Panama IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Suriname IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Bolivia FAO REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Indonesia IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Panama IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
Tanzania IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
PNG IPCC REL & MRV detailed, scheduled, and budgeted 
 
4.3 Democratic Participation (Social Metric 2) 
How are the interests of forest-based communities actively represented?  As Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) illustrate, participation is necessary but insufficient to achieve meaningful 
representation of the interests of participants.  Participation can easily be used to engineer the 
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appearance of consent and legitimacy, making top-down programs look as if they are the desire 
of marginalized communities (Hildyard et al., 2001). 
Participation within the proposals analyzed can be simplified into two different 
categories: consultations and representation.  While multiple types of consultations occurred only 
consultations in which inputs are to be gathered from forest-based communities are considered, 
as other forms of consultations offer no means of influencing project design or implementation.  
While these consultations are only performed to maximize the accessibility of participation 
within REDD+ projects in the hopes of maximizing emission reductions and thereby profits, they 
do achieve some minimum of democratic participation. 
Table 4.3 - Consultations 
Country Participatory activities (Social Metric 2) 
Colombia Extensive Consultations on Local Level 
DRC Participation is by means of consultations 
Mexico Consultations - budgeted/scheduled; 1 consultation per year 
Panama Established consultations - scheduled & budgeted (2c). 
Suriname Culturally respectful iterative engagement with representatives of customary authorities (pg. 21) - 
budgeted/scheduled; NGOs/CSOs (women's groups, youth organizers, etc) also engaged.   
Bolivia Consultation (Output 2.1) - budgeted/scheduled 
Indonesia Consultation with Indigenous CSO representatives (one meeting) listed in Annex 2; Part. Training 
(output 3.2) - scheduled/budgeted. 
Panama Development of a "participatory" mechanism (output 1.2) - budgeted/scheduled; Participatory 
mechanism for resource management (output 1.3) - scheduled/budgeted; Participatory workshop on 
cost (output 1.4) - budgeted/scheduled.   
Tanzania Consultations (Output 4.2) - scheduled/budgeted 
PNG Participatory Reciprocal Dialogue with national multistakeholder groups (Output 5.2; 
budgeted/scheduled) - unclear how structured 
  
The second category of participation was through democratic representation.  Democratic 
representation, according to a policy process theory, is contingent upon accountability to 
constituents and responsiveness (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999).  Accountability depends 
upon the institutions, incentives, and information in place to support it (Agrawal & Ribot, 2012).  
Responsiveness represents the relationship between signals and policies (Manin, Przeworski, & 
Stokes, 1999).  In relation to REDD+, how the participation of representatives of forest-based 
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communities is structured (responsibilities, constraints, powers) on the REDD+ bodies on which 
they participate will constrain the effects of their responsiveness.  These proposals largely fail to 
address the institutional mechanisms by which representatives are chosen. 
What was clear in all but two of the proposals was that there was little to no emphasis 
placed upon the democratic nature of involvement.  The exception was Colombia & Panama’s R-
PP.  Colombia makes references to democratic representation, outlines funding of elections for 
advisory groups, and details the positioning of representatives of forest-based communities on 
the REDD+ IWG board which is responsible for coordinating REDD+.  Colombia further 
provides recognition of local government ownership rights, as well as recognition of the separate 
cultural identities of indigenous, peasant, and Afro-Colombian populations, instead of 
aggregating populations.  Panama’s R-PP has scheduled and has provided a budget for the 
decentralization of REDD+ administration to the provincial and Comarca (indigenous) 
commissions.  The indigenous populations are governed by elected chiefs and are represented on 
the REDD+ Steering Committee.  While provincial governors are appointed by the president, 
mayors are democratically elected and are represented on the SIA Working Committee which 
has a seat on the REDD+ Steering Committee.  It is worth noting that Tanzania has elected 
district councils, but these do not have influence over the central government controlled Forestry 
and Beekeeping Division, but rather over decentralized local government.  They, therefore, are 
incapable of influencing REDD+ implementation despite references to decentralization. 
The inclusion of indigenous representatives in bodies deciding the design and 
implementation of REDD+ or otherwise monitoring and adjusting REDD+ is more empowering 
than consultations as representatives have greater leverage in shaping these processes and their 
role within them.  Bargaining power is critical in ascertaining the honesty of empowerment 
28 
 
(Hildyard et al., 2001) and is dependent upon such things as having a vote on issues (not just a 
voice), proportionality of representation, and checks and balances. 
In six of the proposals studied (Table 4.4, below), forest communities were represented in 
a body having control over REDD+ implementation.  How representatives were selected and 
whether they were selected democratically was not detailed in three out of the six proposals (see 
Table 4.4).  Because of the panoply of interests represented in the stakeholder arrangement 
(CSOs, business interests, and government ministries) there are concerns, due to lack of 
specificity, about proportionality and the ability of indigenous populations to effect meaningful 
representation (see Table 4.4).  In most cases, decision-making processes and proportionality are 
unclear, leaving the overall picture regarding representation unclear as well. 
Table 4.4 – Representation 
Country Body Elected Vote Proportionality Powers Decisions made 
by 
Colombia REDD+ IWG X X 3 seats out of 9 Coordination Vote 
DRC National REDD 
Committee 
NA ? 2 seats out of 14 Admin & 
Oversight  
? 
Mexico REDD-TF ? ? ? REDD+ Design ? 
Panama REDD Steering 
Committee 
X ? 1 seat SIA 
(including 
municipal gov.) & 
1 indigenous of 
6+ 
Oversight & 
Implementation  
? 
Suriname NRWG ? ? 1 seat out of 5 Coordinating & 
Implementation. 
Unclear 
Bolivia NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Indonesia NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Panama COONAPIP ? ? Indigenous 
representatives 
only 
Coordination & 
implementation 
Unclear how it 
fits in with 
broader 
REDD+ 
organization 
Tanzania District Council X ? NA Oversee 
government 
departments 
? 
PNG PEB ? ? Unclear Overview & 
monitoring 
Consensus 
Note. NA represents Not Applicable (there was no supporting institution); X represents an affirmative; ? represents 
data which was unclear or absent. 
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Decentralization efforts were listed in nine out of the ten proposals studied (see Table 
4.5).  Different proposals decentralized different powers to different structures.  There was no 
standardized requirement that decentralization bestow administrative, economic, and policing 
powers down to democratically elected local government.  The cases of Colombia and Panama 
(referenced above) are exceptions, but even in the case of Panama, decentralization is down to 
the provincial level, which is administered by a governor appointed by the president.  What is 
clear in all cases is that democratic representation and involvement of forest communities in 
decision-making processes is not a central consideration in securing their participation.  This 
fails to provide sufficient space to allow forest communities to exercise their prerogative and to 
guarantee that their involvement is voluntary and in their own interest. 
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Table 4.5 – Decentralization 
Country Decentralization 
Colombia Reference is made to ENREDD+ recognizing local government and intent to decentralize ownership 
rights, responsibilities and benefits.  Annex 1b lists a map of stakeholders (including indigenous 
groups, peasant groups, and local governments) their mission, objectives, and roles regarding REDD+.  
Responsibilities overlap and it is unclear if the listed objectives are accepted by the state and by the 
program or simply the result of consultations.            
DRC Deconcentration of administrative powers to provincial level.  Certain decision making abilities are to 
be decentralized to provincial level.  Provincial ministers are appointed.  At provincial level 1 of 3 
representatives on GTCR will be from local populations.  Decentralized provincial governments are 
“autonomous” but appear to administer top down policies, but are allowed to administer economic, 
human, financial, and technical resources as desired in pursuit of national policies.  Decentralization of 
economic management of REDD - budgeted and scheduled.   
Mexico Indigenous communities governed under Community Assemblies (consensus); Table 2a lists funding 
of local governance and community involvement but does not stipulate what these mean.  
Panama Law on Municipal Decentralization (State); Decentralization of REDD+ to Provincial and Comarca 
commissions - budgeted/scheduled (2); Indigenous governed by elected chiefs.  Province governors 
appointed by president.  Municipal mayors elected & consulted.   
Suriname Decentralization of financial and administrative responsibilities of REDD through the Decentralized 
Local Government Strengthening Program (DLGP) - Component 4, financed by Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
Bolivia Already decentralized, including forestry management.  Requires payment distribution development.  
Unsure if decentralization to democratic local government or customary authorities.  REDD+ 
standardization for decentralized implementation (Output 3.1) - scheduled/budgeted/LogFrame 
Indonesia Decentralization focus of Outcome 3 - budgeted/scheduled/LogFrame.  Decentralization descriptions 
are primarily focused on implementation of REDD+.  No reference concerning decentralization to 
local democratic government.      
Panama No mention 
Tanzania District government managed by executive appointment.  Elected local councilors manage wards and 
scrutinize departmental performance.  REDD+ to operate under central government framework of the 
Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD).  FBD operates under centralized government framework. 
REDD plans piloting of decentralized management (output 3.1, budgeted/scheduled).  However, 
REDD is still under the auspices of the FBD, leaving it under central government control.   
PNG Already implemented (problematic) through New Organic Law) - overlapping accountability, 
responsibilities, etc. 
 
4.4 Rights (Social Metric 3) 
What is clear from looking at the recognition of human rights that they are unevenly 
recognized.  If they are unevenly recognized in the proposal, they are even more likely to be 
unevenly applied.  Requiring the acceptance of these rights could be made into a requirement for 
states to participate in REDD+ projects.  Such conditions have been seen in the past with 
development programs.  In the absence of the recognition of such rights, lack of informed 
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consent, lack of respect for rights, and further gender inequalities stand to be the anticipated 
outcomes.       
Referencing Table 4.6, there are three primary sets of human rights which stand out as 
being more regularly included by the different proposals.  The first one is free, prior and 
informed consultation/consent (FPIC).  The World Bank applies a consultation requirement 
whereas some states maintain a consent requirement.  The second set is the Rights of Indigenous 
People, whether based upon the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
(UN-DRIP), or whether provided through national legislation.  The third is against Gender 
Discrimination, whether provided through the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women or otherwise.   
The pattern that emerges regarding the recognition of human rights in these proposals is 
that where they were required, there they are included.  In each of the five R-PPs in which FPIC 
is a requirement, FPIC was included.  Of the five NPDs analyzed, it was only included in one 
(Panama), and referenced in an annex in another (Tanzania).  Panama, however, is also funded 
by the FCPF, which requires FPIC, and has FPIC built into their national General Environment 
Law.  This might help to explain why it is included in their NPD. 
There are far fewer inclusions of indigenous rights.  Of the ten different cases analyzed, 
only three countries recognized indigenous rights.  Of those three different nations, two of them 
(Colombia and Panama) already had those rights constitutionally protected or recognized under 
legislation prior to the introduction of REDD+.  
Gender rights were only recognized in two out of the ten proposals analyzed (DRC and 
Mexico).  Miscellaneous other references to rights were also invoked.  Suriname budgeted, 
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scheduled, and placed within the Terms of Reference implementation of World Bank safeguards.  
Similarly, Tanzania referenced respect for “UNDP principles.” 
Table 4.6 – Rights 
Country FPIC Indigenous Rights Other 
Colombia Integration 
Budgeted/Scheduled 
Constitution; Proposed 
UNDRIP Integration - 
Budgeted/Scheduled 
None 
DRC FPIC UN-DRIP UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
Mexico FPIC (SESA) None Gender Equality (SESA) 
Panama FPIC (Law 41) Indigenous Rights to benefit 
from Lands (Law 41) 
None 
Suriname budgeted/scheduled (1b)  Implementation of World Bank 
safeguard (2d) - 
budgeted/scheduled/ToR. 
Bolivia None None Ambiguous reference to human rights 
(Output 1.6) - budgeted/scheduled/or 
Logframe 
Indonesia None None Rights enforcement and accountability 
– rights not detailed (Output 3.2; 
scheduled/budgeted/LogFrame) 
Panama FPIC (Law 41) Indigenous rights to benefit 
from land (Law 41) 
None 
Tanzania FPIC (in annex though) None UNDP principles reference 
PNG NONE NONE NONE 
 
4.5 Summary 
Privatization of land rights or tenure reform which otherwise assigned land ownership 
was not applied throughout all proposals, being present in only six out of ten, with the majority 
of those failing to do so operating under state land ownership.  This will create difficulties in 
distributing payments to participating landholders for those who have no plan to reform tenure.   
Most proposals (six out of ten) planned on clarifying carbon rights.  Most of those which did not 
operate under state property ownership, raising legitimate concerns regarding state capture of 
REDD+ benefits.  Four out of the six proposals which planned on conducting tenure reform 
planned on including participatory mechanisms for conducting the reforms, while three out of the 
six proposals planning to clarify carbon rights planned on using participatory methods. 
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Market metric 3 was applied in each of the proposals and establishes a very clear trend of 
intent to apply standardized methodologies to delineate carbon in project areas.  Market metric 4 
was consistently the most clearly detailed metric.  Each country had detailed plans for 
establishing reference emission levels and for the implementation of a monitoring, reporting, and 
verification system. 
There was remarkably little emphasis placed on the democratic nature of involvement, 
with only two of the proposals openly addressing the matter.  Forest communities were 
represented in a body having control over REDD+ coordination or implementation in only a slim 
majority of cases.  However, how representatives were selected (whether democratically or not) 
was not detailed in three out of the six proposals.  Decentralization efforts were listed in nine out 
of the ten proposals studied.  Of these, three appeared to be decentralization to democratic local 
governments. One proposal decentralizes to locally elected indigenous government, but also to a 
provincial government operating under executive appointment.  There was no standardized 
requirement that decentralization bestow administrative, economic, and policing powers down to 
democratically elected local government.  Human rights were acutely unevenly and even 
misleadingly applied (FPIC often was under consultation instead of consent), with few 
recognizing indigenous rights or gender equality. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
To explore the importance of social safeguards in REDD+, this study analyzed five 
different R-PP and NPD proposals (ten proposals total) to determine whether or not social 
safeguards protecting forest communities are detailed as consistently and explicitly as market 
components required to integrate REDD+ into the global carbon market.  This was done in order 
to address the questions of how forests and forest communities are integrated into the world-
economy through REDD+ and whether or not it was empowering. 
My analysis indicates that social safeguards were not as consistently applied as market 
components.  Market metric three was referenced in each proposal.  Market metric four was 
consistently well defined and had detailed budgets and schedules.  Market metrics one and two 
require some qualifications; four out of the ten proposals were insufficiently detailed.  This lack 
of clarity concerning tenure and carbon rights has been observed and remarked upon by 
researchers (Sunderlin et al., 2009).  While defined private tenure rights are an assumed 
requirement for PES, programs have been demonstrated within common and state property 
tenure regimes (Bartels et al., 2010; Corbera, 2010).  Resistance to clarifying tenure rights within 
nations with state owned property regimes may represent an attempt to capture profits from 
REDD+ programs while resistance in indigenous-controlled common property regimes may be a 
reflection of the inability to tease tenure out of its social relationships and cultural elements 
(Streck, 2009). 
Social safeguards were not as consistently applied as those requirements for integration 
into the market.  In all but two of the proposals, there was little to no emphasis placed upon the 
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democratic nature of involvement.  While four out of six tenure reforms and three out of six 
carbon rights reforms involved participatory mechanisms, this was out of ten proposals.  Human 
rights were not evenly applied.  Where they were applied, they frequently were applied in a 
manner inconsistent with their purpose.  Inclusion of free, prior and informed consultation by the 
World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in their R-PPs fall far short of free, 
prior and informed consent and was only included to counter resistance to World Bank 
development projects (Goldman, 2005; Griffiths, 2008; Hildyard et al., 2001).  Participation is 
widely referenced throughout the proposals, but undefined, appearing to be applied in a 
managerial manner consistent with Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) observations.  Clarification is 
required to define how representatives are selected, how they are kept accountable to their 
constituents, and how they are empowered to responsively pursue the interests of those they 
represent.  Choice of institutions recognized requires further consideration as well.  
Decentralizing powers to customary authorities versus democratic local government will result in 
differences in recognition of local identities and their associated rights, as well as the role this 
plays in the production of a public forum (Ribot, 2007).  Further, statements consistent with 
Pagiola et al. (2007), that poverty alleviation is not a priority in PES, cast spatial analyses of 
social and environmental impacts associated with protection of livelihoods in a cynical light.  
Without appropriate pro-poor measures, such tools risk being used to target and exploit a cheap 
labor force and cheap rents in pursuit of emission reductions. 
The significance of these findings is that social protections are not sufficiently specified 
in the REDD documents to ensure equal consideration with those elements, such as reference 
emission levels, aimed to establish market integration.  Inclusion of democratic mechanisms of 
representation and participation need to be more thoroughly elaborated upon and referenced.  As 
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the proposals studied stand, potential safeguards may be utilized for cross-purposes and are not 
pro-poor.  In order for REDD+ to effectively achieve emission reductions that can promise to 
meet permanence standards and avoid leakage, forest communities must voluntarily participate.  
Salesmanship and maintenance of information asymmetries can only go so far in creating willing 
and committed participation.  What is required is democratic participation and recognition of the 
rights and cultures of forest communities. 
Progress does appear to be being made on social safeguards for REDD.  Rutt’s (2012) 
review of social safeguards indicates that the UN-REDD and the FCPF are both increasingly 
focused on providing safeguards.  The UNFCCC has also increasingly integrated the need for 
safeguard inclusion into their agreements as represented in the Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC 
2011) and the Durban Document (UNFCCC 2012a).  How they will fit into government reforms 
which are already underway and which are facilitating pilot programs conducted for 
demonstrational purposes is still a question, as are enforcement mechanisms.  As Ribot (1995) 
demonstrates concerning forestry reforms in Senegal, reforms require proper institutionalization, 
or they will be ignored or abused.  Will the safeguards adopted provide adequate political space 
to allow forest communities to truly control the terms of their participation?  Will safeguards be 
required or sporadically applied?  If safeguards are not implemented evenly, will the world-
economy label such implementations “uncompetitive” and discipline them? 
 
37 
 
Appendix 
Social Consequences of PES in Practice 
In a recent review of PES programs, Tacconi et al. (2010) drew case studies from 9 
different PES programs implemented across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  Their findings 
indicate that these programs have resulted in positive livelihood benefits.  Gains include 
increases in income, diversification of livelihoods through technical assistance programs, 
development of communal institutions for resource management collaboration, and increased 
proximity to the state through implementation agencies.  Each case, however, had its own unique 
problems hidden in this blanket positive assessment. 
Uganda (German et al., 2010) and Mozambique (Jindal, 2010) featured frontloaded 
payment systems, where income gains were designed to be alluring, allowing participants to 
overcome startup costs, which otherwise would have acted as barriers to participation.  This 
resulted in heavier upfront payments, but raised questions concerning program compliance in 
upcoming years where reduced payments or no payments would be forthcoming. 
In some of these programs (Jindal, 2010; Osborne, 2011), contract lengths are for 100 
year periods, in order to obtain higher premiums which come with achieving permanence 
requirements stipulated by the IPCC.  However, payments are only disbursed over the first few 
years of this 100 year contract.  Further, even though carbon offsets meeting the permanence 
requirement can fetch a higher price than those which do not, such offsets provide participants 
increased incomes only marginally above those of non-participants who are not bound to 100 
year contracts and who retain the right to use their land as they please (Jindal, 2010).   
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It is also apparent that no carbon market readily exists for these offsets to be produced 
and traded upon.  Instead, what we see is an array of institutional diversity involved in mediating 
these contracts (Tacconi et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010).  This is affirmed in the inability of payments 
to be made directly to participants upon conditionality.  Although in Mozambique (Jindal, 2010), 
Nicaragua/Colombia (Rios & Pagiola, 2010), and Uganda (German et al., 2010) PES payments 
went directly to households, in Brazil (Bartels et al., 2010) and Mexico (Corbera, 2010) they 
went to community-based institutions, which then allocated payments. In all of these cases the 
funds were managed by the state, which acted as a key intermediary between participants and the 
market. 
Other key problems with PES as implemented so far, from a Coasean perspective, were 
the high transaction costs, which were found in each case study and which sometimes ran as high 
as 66% of revenue earned (Jindal, 2010).  Tacconi et al. (2010) conducted their study of the 
livelihoods of functional PES programs under the assumption that opportunity and transaction 
cost analysis required to spatially target land use interventions to maximize results and returns 
would have been conducted and available for analysis.  This assumption proved false for various 
reasons.  In the case of Brazil (Bartels et al., 2010) a lack of focus on economic incentives also 
saw a lack of emphasis on meeting conditionality and  avoidance of the varied transaction costs 
involved with implementing a functional MRV and conducting a rigorous REL. 
While the guiding principle of PES is the idea of associating economic incentives with 
environmental outcomes, Corbera (2010) illustrates that this is not always the outcome.  Cobera 
(2010) details the Mexican Payments for Carbon, Biodiversity, and Agroforestry Services (PSA-
CABSA) PES program ushered in by the 2003 General Law of Sustainable Forest Development.  
While the program targeted poor/marginalized communities for greater pay, strict eligibility 
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requirements between 2004 and 2006 were extremely difficult to meet, with rejection rates of 
over 80%.  These eligibility requirements were especially prohibitive for poor communities.  
Extensive capacity training and testing of service extenders have since been conducted, resulting 
in higher acceptance rates with rejections dropping to 50% between 2007 and 2008.  The 
program has been successful in establishing a normativity of conservation, however, payments 
for participation were below opportunity costs and participants reported recognition of this in 
interviews and surveys.  Although Corbera claimed the program targeted the poor, this was due 
to land redistribution policies that were the result of the 1910 Mexican Revolution and the 1917 
Mexican Constitution.  To say that PES targets the poor in this case is to say that it targets rural 
land use. 
The description by Bartels et al. (2010) of the Brazilian Proambiente PES program 
further demonstrates how PES can sometimes fail to associate payments with outcomes.  In the 
Proambiente program, funds are disbursed to families by Fundo Constitutional de Financiomento 
do Norte, with extension service financed by the Ministry of Environment. This funding has been 
plagued by bureaucratic irregularity and has focused more on assisting to provide “help with 
costs” funds for overcoming capital requirements for participation in the PES program.  
Payments through the program do not exceed opportunity costs.  However, participants primarily 
participate to learn techniques to diversify livelihoods and to augment incomes when possible.  
Further, the program does not conduct MRV because of the costs involved and cannot guarantee 
conditionality, or that leakage has not occurred.  Payments fail to be connected with results 
because neither can be guaranteed. 
Jindal (2010) analyzed the Nhambita Community Carbon Project (NCCP) in Sofala 
province, Mozambique, a program which combined A/R activities with REDD activities to 
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produce private incomes and a communal trust fund for communal investments, as well as 
support of micro enterprises and other alternative livelihoods.  The NCCP pays individual 
smallholders living on communal land, who were allotted rights to the land by the community for 
carbon sequestration through agroforestry efforts.  The NCCP also raised funds through 
community reductions in deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in community owned 
miombo woodlands and democratically allocated funds to community infrastructure investments.  
These funds subsidize micro enterprises to provide alternative livelihoods that were supported or 
otherwise integrated into these afforestation and conservation efforts.  To achieve permanence 
and attract higher prices, contracts are for 100 year periods while payments conclude within the 
first seven years of the project.  While payments for households receiving income from 
agroforestry contracts were US$1435.40, non-participants received an average annual income of 
US$1200 and retained flexible land use.  While an innovative program, it draws attention to the 
unfairness of the contracts and payment schemes.  Tacconi et al. (2010) also draw attention to the 
lack of understanding in participants about contract duration, questioning compliance once funds 
run out, as well as the intergenerational fairness of such long contracts. 
Another innovative program design was illustrated by Rios and Pagiola (2010), who 
detailed the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project in Nicaragua and 
Colombia, with a specific emphasis on analyzing the ability of poor households to participate.  
Participation amongst the poor was determined by categorizing participants on three 
socioeconomic levels (very-poor, poor, non-poor) based on income in relation to the poverty line 
in Nicaragua and Colombia.  The program paid participants US$75 per incremental point of land 
use change in an Environmental Service Index in which points correlated with more beneficial 
land-use changes.  This point system allowed inclusion of land-use changes with less-stringent 
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requirements and smaller rewards in order to facilitate participation by poor households.  While 
the extremely poor were found to be capable of participating successfully, attention was drawn to 
the fact “it takes three contacts with low income households to achieve the same [emission 
reductions] as a single contract with a high income household” (Rios & Pagiola, 2010, p. 238) 
while low income households entail greater transaction costs and greater inefficiency.  This is no 
insignificant observation, as the carbon market is set to operate under a differential opportunity 
cost mechanism in which PES providers will compete on the basis of price with other PES 
providers, meaning that the poor will be inefficient and driven out of the market unless capable 
of driving down price which is largely a reflection of transaction costs. 
Beymer-Farris and Bassett’s (2011) study of the Warufiji people of the Rufiji Delta in 
Tanzania illustrates how the poor are sometimes targeted as drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation in an effort to make implementation of REDD readiness projects easier by removing 
the human element from the equation.  The Warufiji people, residents of the Rufiji Delta for over 
2000 years, were labeled squatters on their tribal lands through legislation in 1957, with further 
legislation in 1987 and 2002 limiting forest related activities in the Delta.  While the forest was 
placed under joint forest management, in which an elected village council representative 
coordinates with the national or district-level government, the government is not required to 
listen to village representatives, rendering participation a farce.  Instead, “participation” 
legitimates government policies that reduce the livelihoods of the Warufiji without providing 
alternative livelihoods. 
The World Wildlife Foundation has had programs in the area since 2004, including a 
reforestation program, and has been working towards implementation of a REDD project in the 
Delta (Daily News, 2011).  The activities endangering the mangroves, as listed on the WWF 
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website, are the livelihoods of the Warufiji people (Cook, 2009).  In order to simplify the 
legibility of REDD in the Rufiji Delta the Warufiji have been fictitiously labeled as invaders in 
order to legitimate their expulsion to a global public (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2011).  On 
October 28th, 2011, the Tanzanian government, on behalf of the Mangrove Management Project, 
forcibly evicted thousands of Warufiji villagers from their forests, burning their homes so they 
could not return (Daily News, 2011; Lang, 2012, May 9).  On top of portraying the poor as the 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, it also illustrates that involvement of 
transnational social movements such as the WWF does not always support the empowerment of 
local populations by bringing a counter power to the state into the equation, but can serve instead 
as the legitimating force for coercion and violence by the state or other international interests. 
The involvement of the WWF in the Rufiji Delta also serves to illustrate the role 
corruption and embezzlement of international funds can play in REDD+ projects.  Since 
Beymer-Farris and Bassett (2011) report, the Tanzanian WWF REDD+ project has subsequently 
been halted on the basis of corruption and embezzlement charges.  An estimated US$200,000 of 
the US$1.3 million “Strengthening Capacity of Environmental Civil Society Organizations” 
program funded by the Norwegian government disappeared, reportedly through purposefully 
exaggerated per diems.  The embezzlement charges led to the resignation of WWF’s Tanzania 
country director Stephen Mariki, along with one other manager and thirteen other employees 
(Makoye, 2012).  This serves as an example of how intermediaries can utilize information 
asymmetries between fund providers and service providers for unlawful purposes and potential 
gain. 
German et al. (2010) illustrates how PES can violate customary laws, as well as be 
implemented under contracts of questionable fairness.  The Trees for Global Benefits program in 
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the Bushenyi district of Uganda grew out of the 2002 Forestry Sector Review inquiry into policy 
reforms necessary to become CDM compliant.  The landless poor, under customary law, used to 
have rights of access to fallow lands.  However, it is these fallow lands which are used in the 
PES program, effectively preventing the landless from gathering fuel, grazing animals, and 
cultivating the land, which increases the vulnerability of the most vulnerable subsection of the 
population.  There are also questions about the fairness of contracts which pay 50% of the total 
PES payment for a 20 year contract in the first year.  In 2005-2006, the initial payment was 
US$250 compared against the US$94 average rural income non-participants received.  However, 
much of this initial payment is to cover startup costs to ensure participants can participate.  
Yearly disbursements of remaining funds are well below opportunity costs, at US$13 per year. 
Osborne’s (2011) analysis of the Scolel Té carbon forestry project in Chiapas, Mexico 
illustrates how the costs of forest conservation can unequally burden the forest communities who 
implement these programs.  Utilizing Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access, Kautsky’s 
agrarian question, and Harvey’s theory of accumulation by dispossession, Osborne asks how 
farmers actually benefit (versus how they should, theoretically) from farming mediated by 
capitalistic relations which are continually enclosing farmers land.  This process of enclosure 
manifests through the preoccupation of labor in REDD-related activities, as well as committing 
land to REDD and thereby constraining its alternative uses for contracts which run through four 
separate twenty-five-year cycles (one hundred years).  Despite these burdens, indigenous 
smallholders are forced to participate in order to attain tenure security and to prevent land use by 
forest invaders. 
Fairhead et al. (2012) suggest how REDD+ can be a tool utilized as a new form of land 
grabbing, legitimated upon a global conservation narrative. The review of numerous REDD+ 
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programs and other conservation projects illustrate what they refer to as “green grabbing” which 
does not entirely alienate previous tenants from the land, but instead “[restructures] the rules and 
authority over the access, use and management of resources, in related labor relations, and in 
human-ecological relationships…” (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 239).  This process of restructuring 
is highly contextual and contingent, relying upon the history of previous iterations of public 
enclosures to legitimate the current episode.  This is part of a global process, legitimated on an 
international need for foods, fuels, and carbon sinks, which sees the communal or public rights of 
local populations enclosed and reserved for private use on a global market. 
A study by Leggett and Lovell (2012) reported extensive elite capture in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) REDD+ program operated by EarthSky, Ltd., with the authors going so far as to 
call upon the government of Papua New Guinea to shut the project down.  In PNG, legal 
recognition of representation of clan community rights occurs through registration as an 
Incorporated Landowner Group or Landowner Company.  This process is very complex, 
allowing individuals to exploit information asymmetries and to take advantage of their position.  
In this case, Hunstein Range Holdings Ltd, the established representative of the April-Salomei 
peoples, committed the lands they manage and the people they represent to REDD+ without their 
free, prior informed consent but claimed to have obtained their consent in documents reported to 
EarthSky, Ltd.  Analysis of the project design by Leggett and Lovell (2012) concluded that 
benefits would accrue to project implementers who were taking advantage of their position 
between EarthSky, Ltd. and the April-Salomei people to profit from the project, while very few 
benefits would trickle down to landowners who were under-informed about the project and had 
no hand in its design.  Implementation costs and livelihoods restrictions, however, would be 
entirely borne by landowners. 
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There are further reports on news blogs such as www.redd-monitor.org which underline 
conflicts and problems in REDD+ implementation as they arise, which otherwise might not make 
it into academic articles or studies.  These reports highlight the many inequalities and power 
asymmetries in the implementation of these projects and the overlooked conflicts that arise in 
their application.  One such report (Lang, 2012, November 23) detailed the Guaraqueçaba 
Climate Action Project in the Ecuadoran Amazon.  This is a REDD+ type project operated by 
Chevron, General Motors, and American Electric Power with the assistance of conservation 
organizations such as the Society for Wildlife Research and Environmental Education and The 
Nature Conservancy.  The project controls deforestation and forest degradation by using armed 
guards to police access (and in some cases kill offenders), preventing indigenous people from 
accessing their forests and restricting their livelihoods.  In another case detailed in the same 
report, the UK-based New Forest Company, partially owned by HSBC bank, forcibly evicted 
22,000 people in the Mubende and Kiboga districts in Uganda in their private REDD+ type 
project.  These are just two illustrations of a frequent disregard for the human element, which is 
occluded in a process of commodification that obstructs a complex series of relationships behind 
a price tag. 
These different case studies illustrate concerns with the implementation of REDD-
readiness projects and other PES projects and demonstrate the need for safeguards.  We saw that 
the prima facie assumption that participation in a PES program is always better than non-
participation, premised upon payments exceeding opportunity costs, is not always accurate 
(Bartels et al., 2010; Corbera, 2010; German et al., 2010).  We learned that frontloaded contracts 
and misleading payment schedules were common (German et al., 2010; Jindal, 2010), and that 
many contracts had unreasonable lengths (Jindal, 2010; Osborne, 2011). The poor were 
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sometimes targeted as the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and subjected to 
restrictions on forest livelihoods and evictions (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2011; Daily News, 
2012; Lang, 2012, May 9).  We read of the propensity towards elite capture (Lovell & Leggett, 
2012) and towards corruption and embezzlement (Makoye, 2012, March 2).  There was also 
evidence of PES programs being used as a new form of land grabbing (Fairhead et al., 2012), as 
well as their tendency to place undue burden on the participants (Osborne, 2011) and indirect 
costs on nonparticipants (German et al., 2010).  These all illustrate the impact which PES 
programs can have on the livelihoods of marginalized forest communities and challenge the 
prima facie assumption that participation is always the more rational choice.     
These different case studies illustrate concerns with the implementation of REDD+ and 
other PES projects and demonstrate the need for safeguards.  While sold on the normative basis 
of sustainable development and poverty alleviation, many are in fact resulting in eviction, 
violence, and reduced access to forest livelihoods as well as shifting the cost for emission 
reductions from developing nations onto forest communities in developing nations.  The question 
is, can solutions be found which safeguard the vulnerable in developing nations and what might 
these look like? 
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